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Tor is not enough: Coercion in Remote Electronic Voting Systems

Author(s): Christian Meter, Alexander Schneider, Philipp Hagemeister, Martin Mauve.
Title: Tor is not enough: Coercion in Remote Electronic Voting Systems
Published: arXiv.org, Cornell University Library Cryptography and Security (), pp. , February 2017
Keyword(s): Electronic Voting, Cryptography, Security, Simulation, E-Voting, Coercion
Abstract: Current electronic voting systems require an anonymous channel during the voting phase to prevent coercion. Typically, low-latency anonymization-networks like Tor are used for this purpose. In this paper we devise a monitoring attack that allows an attacker to monitor whether participants of an election voted, despite the use of a low-latency network during the voting phase, thereby breaking an important part of coercion-freeness. We implement a simulation carrying out our attack and measure its success rates.
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